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DIASSUWCCA 219-83

SUMMARY OF
SIGNIFICANT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
AND CIVIL DISTURBANCE ACTIVITIES
9 November 1983

GUATEMALA: PLANS TO ROCKET U.S. AMBASSADOR'S CAR (U)

(S/NF/NC/WN/ORCON) In DIASSUWCCA 214-83 we reported alleged plans to car bomb the U.S. and/or Israeli embassies. In DIASSUWCCA 217-83 we reported a Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) strafing attack of the residence of U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, Frederick Chapin. New reporting now indicates that the FAR have determined that the security at the U.S. Embassy and the residence of the ambassador is too tight to arrange for the proper placement of a car bomb. Reportedly, the FAR have, as a result, decided to launch a rocket-grenade (RPG-2) attack against the ambassador's vehicle. Further, they have described their planned action as a "Christmas present." According to the report, the rocket has already been purchased with money given to the FAR by the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT/O). The PGT/O money allegedly comes from the ransom paid to them by the family of kidnapped newspaper general manager, Pedro Julio Garcia (see DIASSUWCDA 198-83, 200-83, 203-83, and 208-83). The report also indicates that the FAR strafing attack on the ambassador's residence was mounted so as to observe the security of the ambassador's residence. Reportedly, occupants of one car fired on the residence while the second car parked nearby to see the reaction of the security guards.

(S/NF/NC/WN) Comment: Allegedly, the purpose of the originally planned car bombings was to protest U.S./Israeli support for governments opposed to leftist terrorists/guerrillas in Central America. The recent events in Grenada have, undoubtedly, exacerbated these anti-U.S. feelings among terrorists/leftists. Thus, PGT-O and FAR cooperation is not surprising. However, in DIASSUWCCA 214-83's report on the car bombing plans, military leaders of the FAR were reported to have regarded security at the embassy as too tight to afford a reasonable chance of success. The above reporting which indicates the strafing attack on the ambassador's residence was to observe security does not logically "track" as the action of a group contemplating an assassination since the strafing incident can only lead to greater security efforts. Thus, while we believe the FAR is capable of planning and attempting an assassination by either a car bombing or RPG-2 type attack, their pre-operational surveillance of security is, to say the least, indiscreet.

PERU: ATTEMPTED BOMBING AT MARINE SECURITY GUARD RESIDENCE (U)

(C) According to embassy reporting, the residence of U.S. Marines in Lima was targeted on Sunday, 5 November 1983. The reports indicate that a Marine who was departing the residence noticed two containers, one with a fuse, placed at the front door of the residence and a freshly painted slogan in large block

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GUATEMALA: THREAT UPDATE TO U.S. AMBASSADOR AND U.S. EMBASSY (U)

(S/NF/NC/WN/OR) In DIASSUWCDA 214-83 we reported on an alleged car bomb plot against the U.S. Embassy and/or the Israeli Embassy in the near future. Reportedly, the terrorists had acquired the necessary explosives, and a stolen car for the operation; however, it was reported that the military leaders of the terrorist organization involved considered security at these embassies as too tight to allow for adequately placing the bomb to afford a reasonable chance of success. In DIASSUWCDA 217-83 we reported a Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) strafing attack on the residence of U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, Frederick Chapin. In DIASSUWCDA 219-83 we reported that as a result of the FAR's previous analyses of security around the U.S. Embassy and the reaction of the strafing attack of the security guards at Ambassador Chapin's home, FAR had concluded that a rocket-grenade (RPG-2) attack against the Ambassador's vehicle would be the modus operandi to be utilized. Reportedly, the RPG-2 had already been acquired and the attack was being described as a "Christmas present."

as a result of the 4 November 1983 strafing attack and observation of security reaction thereto, the FAR and the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT-0) under direction of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), have decided that an assassination attempt directly against the Ambassador can be successfully undertaken some time in December 1983. Reportedly, "several" RPGs have been acquired to be employed against the Ambassador's vehicle at some, as yet undetermined point in the city. Reportedly, the FAR group believes security agents at the Ambassador's home were caught in a timely and effective manner. Further, the URNG reportedly remains firmly committed to planting a car bomb at the U.S. Embassy. Allegedly, because of their evaluation of the reaction during the attack on the Ambassador's residence, the FAR and the PGT-0 believe that a car bomb can be successfully planted at the U.S. Embassy and that a successful attempt against the U.S. Ambassador also can be carried out. Finally, a report of 10 November 1983 indicates that an Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) commando unit in Guatemala City is targeting the U.S. Defense Attache assigned to the U.S. Embassy. According to this information a group of 12 ORPA commandos who recently completed training in Cuba were in Guatemala City to carry out the attack on the attache. Of these 12 terrorists, four have already been killed in firefights with Guatemalan security officials, but the remaining eight are still at large and continue to have the mission of attacking the attache.

(S/NF/NC/WN/OR) Comment: As we indicated in DIASSUWCDA 219-83, the FAR is capable of planning and attempting an assassination by either a car bomb or PRG-2 attack. However, we continue to believe that the "logic" being applied to this operation by the FAR and PGT-0 is in our view specious. For example, initially these groups believed security around the embassy was too tight to allow for a reasonable chance of success utilizing a car bomb. Now, as a result of the strafing incident, they have concluded that both an RPG-2 attack against the Ambassador's vehicle and a car bomb incident against the embassy are feasible. We fail to see how security at the residence relates to the security surrounding a vehicle en route or at the embassy. Further, the strafing incident appears to be the telegraphing of a blow aimed at an allegedly earmarked target. In this regard, the targeting and other obvious activities at the Ambassador's residence may have been a smokescreen for the actual target,

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the Defense Attache, or possibly some other potential targets. The involvement of the URNG, an umbrella organization for terrorist/leftist elements in Guatemala, is also a new and interesting development. The new reporting which indicates ORPA involvement in an operation targeting an attache is serious, interesting, and consistent with the above information. Both ORPA, PGT-O and FAR come under the URNG, both ORPA and FAR have worked together in the past, and the URNG has strong Cuban connections. While we believe that all of the above reporting is a clear-cut indicator that something is amiss in Guatemala, we also believe that the indicators, i.e., the strafing of the Ambassador's residence and the apparent flimsy logic already alluded to are too obvious. A threat definitely has been identified to the ambassador, the embassy and the attache, but security at other potential targets should not be overlooked. In short, we believe a clear cut threat exists to all U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in Guatemala and we would recommend a long term upgrade of all security resources afforded to some.

PERU: VIOLENCE MARKS ELECTIONS (U)

(U) As expected, Sendero Luminoso (SL) (Shining Path) terrorists launched a series of attacks in Lima and in the Andes Highlands in an effort to disrupt the 13 November elections. The attacks began on 11 November in Lima when a series of apparently coordinated bombings resulted in property damage and two minor injuries. A brief power failure resulted in several suburban districts. Among the buildings targeted included the Honduran Embassy in Lima, which received serious damage to the ground and first floor from three bombs. Although minor explosions occurred near the U.S. Ambassador's residence, an unconfirmed report states that police defused a bomb which was apparently thrown at the residence but failed to detonate. On 12 November the SL reportedly was responsible for hurling at least six bombs into the offices of the right-wing Popular Christian Party in the affluent Miraflores suburb. The bombs blew apart the building's doors and balcony, resulting in the death of two guards and the critical wounding of another. Simultaneously, SL terrorists machine-gunned and dynamited two offices of the government's Popular Action Party in the Lima suburbs. One guard was killed and several reported wounded in the attack. The above attacks came despite heavy patrols by Army, Navy and Air Force units in most major cities.

(U) Turnout for the municipal election was termed normal Sunday as heavy police and military security was evident. While SL had reportedly threatened to kill people who voted, the turnout was apparently normal since voting is mandatory in Peru. Strict new regulations impose heavy penalties on people who do not vote.

(C) In other possibly related developments, the Peruvian embassy in Washington, D.C. reported receiving a bomb threat on 10 November. Peruvian officials are apparently concerned for their safety here based on that action and the upcoming visit by Prime Minister Schwalb to Washington to attend the 14 November General assembly meeting of the Organization of American States. As a result, general security in the vicinity of Peruvian facilities in Washington will be stepped up during Schwalb's visit.

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The BR member also complained about the tight security around the embassy, which hampered their surveillance.

(S/NF/WN) Comment: Security at the embassy has been increased since the 24 October intervention in Grenada. The embassy notes that there is evidence that the ambassador's residence was under surveillance in mid-October prior to the Grenada intervention. Two known leftists were arrested in the vicinity of the ambassador's home, questioned by police, and subsequently released. The report of BR involvement in surveillance of the embassy is somewhat surprising given the success of security forces during the past year.

GUATEMALA: TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. AMBASSADOR ALLEGEDLY DELAYED
(S/NF/NC/WN/ORCON)

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[redacted] there has been a temporary standdown, as of mid-November, on the planning activities of terrorists against the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. Embassy. The delay was caused apparently by the temporary departure from Guatemala City of a Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) commandante who is charged with planning and conducting the operation. The FAR is in league for the operation with terrorists of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-O). Planning for the operation is expected to resume when the FAR commandante returns to Guatemala City in the near future.

(S/NF/NC/WN/ORCON) Since 2 November, we have noted a variety of threats or attacks against U.S. persons or property (see DIASSUWCDA's 214-83, 217-83, 219-83, and 221-83 for more detailed earlier reports). These have ranged from an alleged car bomb attack plot against either the U.S. or Israeli Embassies, a threat to kill the U.S. Defense Attache, to a strafing run on the U.S. Ambassador's home. While some of the reported scenarios seem to lack logic, we nevertheless believe the threat is and will remain very genuine through at least December.

GREECE: UPDATE TO ASSASSINATION OF U.S. NAVAL OFFICER (U)

(U) On 18 November, Athens newspapers published the proclamation issued by the 17 November organization, which has claimed responsibility for the murder of Captain George Tsantes and his driver (see DIASSUWCDA's 225-83, 223-83, 222-83). The lengthy proclamation, covering seven typewritten pages, included the following:

- Captain Tsantes was "executed" in order to strike at JUSMAGG, which along with other U.S. military in Greece, is alleged to constitute "an occupation, terrorist force."

- The 17 November organization is resuming "violent revolution" after a two-year period in which it had waited to see the results of the present government. In their view the socialist government has failed to carry out the U.S. base closings and social reforms promised before the 1981 elections.

- A large amount of the proclamation is devoted to criticizing the Greek press for supporting the present government, and threatens to take action against those who are judged to slander the organization by wrongfully attributing actions to it or distorting its words and acts.

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PUERTO RICO: POSSIBLE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. NAVY COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES (U)

(C) Late reporting indicates that Puerto Rican terrorists may have recently attempted surveillance activities of remotely located U.S. Navy communications facilities. According to the report, on 27 October 1983 a contract guard at the VLF transmitter site, Aguada, PR stopped a man attempting to gain access to the site. Reportedly, the man identified himself as a "Mr. Bumford" (nfi) and stated that he represented the "National Oceanographic Office" which was doing a survey of the area. The man indicated that as part of the survey he was to photograph the Aguada site. The man also indicated that he was a close personal friend of the CO, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads and it was alright for him to photograph. The guard, however, did not allow access and the man departed. In another possible surveillance attempt on 28 October 1983, a reservist (nfi) entering Camp Santiago, Salinas, PR reported to a guard that he had just seen a man with a telephoto lens photographing a communication site located on Camp Santiago. The guard notified the site manager who responded but saw no one.

(C/NF) Comment: Puerto Rican terrorist groups have employed, in the past, pre-operational surveillance techniques such as photography and sketching. We note that the dates of the reported potential surveillance attempts occurred after the commencement of U.S. actions in Grenada which suggests that this activity could be part of a response to events in Grenada. Noteworthy also, and possibly related, is the recent LAW attack in San Juan against a U.S. Government building (see DIASSUWCDA 212-83 and 213-83). In that attack, the Puerto Rican radical group "Los Machetoros" (EPA) claimed responsibility. While it is impossible to confirm, at this point, that the "surveillance" attempts described above were in fact accomplished by a terrorist group, we do note that targets such as these remotely located facilities at Aguada and Camp Salinas are preferred by such groups because of their remoteness and, generally, minimum guard coverage. We note also that the Camp Salinas site is alleged to be a "Mystic Star" antenna field (White House Communications). An attack against such a target could be expected to attract considerable media attention -another consideration in target selection. Finally, the LAW attack against the FBI office was the first demonstration of a "stand-off" attack capability by Puerto Rican terrorists. In light of this newly demonstrated capability and the surveillance of these two facilities, a new security review of both facilities and potential surrounding firing positions may be prudent.

MARTINIQUE: BOMBING ATTACK (U)

(U) Late reporting indicates that an apparent time-delayed bomb exploded at about 0230 hours, 1 November 1983 on the ground floor of a building that houses the U.S. Consulate General in Fort de France. The bomb exploded in an area of the building occupied by the Chase Manhattan Bank. There was no apparent damage to the Consulate General offices although minor structural damage occurred to the bank's transformer room. Additionally, some windows were broken on the first and second floors of the building. Reportedly, there were no personal injuries resulting from the blast. Police said they received a letter claiming responsibility for the attack from the General Conference of Martinique Labor. The letter, addressed to President Reagan, demanded the immediate withdrawal of U.S. combat forces on Grenada.

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